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L.: Gifts--Choses in Action--Delivery
BECENT CASES

ljethtown, 275 IlI. 167, 114 N. E. 14; City of Miami v. Florida
etc. Co., 84 So. 726 (Fla.). The principal case, which is the
fArst case in which the West Virginia court has been called upon
to decide this question, seems to have definitely adopted the latter
-view. In those states where the rule of the principal case on this
point is followed, the courts are not agreed as to the extent of acceptance necessary to make the dedication irrevocable. Some hold
that an acceptance of one or more of the streets shown on the plat
is an acceptance of all, unless a contrary intention be clearly
shown. Village of Lee v. Harris, 206 Ill. 428, 69 N. E. 230;
Oaruthersville v. Huffman, 262 Mo. 367, 171 S. W. 323. Others
hold that the dedicator may revoke the dedication as to those
streets not actually accepted. Moore v. City of Chicago, 261 Ill.
56, 103 N. E. 583; Kennedy v. Mayor, etc. of Cumberland, 65
21r. 514, 9 Atl. 234. See 3 DmLoN, MuN ICPAL CORPORATIOiTS,
5 ed., 1734-1735. If the plat is considered as an offer on the
part of the landowner to dedicate all the streets, etc., shown
thereon as an entirety, it would seem logically to follow that the
acceptance must be of the whole. Inasmuch, however, as this
might impose undue burdens upon the municipality, without correspondingly benefiting anybody, it is thought that the doctrine of the principal case is the better view.
-W. F. K.
GFTs-CHos- in ACTIONq-DELiVER.-A father, by his will,
gave a farm to his four younger sons. The farm was srbject
to a lien debt, which was evidenced by four bonds, and the four
sons were to take the farm charged with such lien debt. During his lifetime the father paid certain of the bonds which had
become due and told the sons, in conference, that they owed him
the sum which he had paid. They tendered a check in payment,
but he did not accept. He told them to pay the money to their
two married sisters. The father died, and the question was
-whether the two married sisters could obtain the sum which the
father had paid on the bonds. Held, they could not, but such
sum should be paid to the father's estate. Poff v. Poff, 104 S. E.
719 (Va. 1920).
The general legal principle regulating gifts of personalty is
that mere words of donation will not suffice to pass title. Stratton v. Atiwl Savings Bank, 213 Mass. 46, 99 N. E. 454. With
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regard to chattels, there must be an actual delivery of possession.
or a deed of gift. Barnes v. Banks, 223 Ill. 352; Ross v. Milne,
12 Leigh 204 (Va.); Connor v. Trauwick, 37 Ala. 289. The
same rule applies to gifts of choses in action represented by a
specialty; and the delivery of such specialty must amount to a
transfer of all the donor's control or dominion over the subject.
In some cases where actual delivery of a chattel cannot be made,
resort may be had to what has been called a symbolical delivery.
White v. Kilgore, 77 Me. 571. A chose in action not represented
by a specialty cannot be physically transferred. It has been
held, therefore, that such a chose in action cannot be given away
irrevocably. Cook v. Lum, 55 N. J. L. 373.
However, anequitable chose in action, which is just as intangible, and delivery
of which is just as impossible, may be given away without any
formalities other than an expression of intent. Harding v. Harding, 17 Q. B. D. 442; Wilt v. Hoffman, 46 W. Va. 473, 33 S. E.
279. There seems to be no good reason for the distinction which
exists between legal and equitable choses in action. The principal
case is concerned with a legal chose, and is in accord with the settled law, but it would seem that such decision might be argued to,
be wrong on principle.
-A. W. L.
LICENSE-LICENSOR'S LIABILITY TO LICENSEE-DUTY ON RhAUi,-

CoPANY.-Plaintiff, an adult, not in the employ of the
railroad company, was struck by a backing train and killed,
while using a railroad track as a footpath for his own convenience elsewhere than at a public crossing. Two problems:
were presented. First, whether the railroad company had any
duty to look out for the plaintiff. Second, whether the railroad
company owed a duty after perceiving the plaintiff to do more
than refrain from the infliction of wanton or wilful injury.
Held, there was no duty to look out for plaintiff, but afterhe was discovered there was a duty on the defendant to use reasonable care to avoid injuring him. Robertson v. Coal & Coke
R. Co., 104 S. E. 615 (W. Va. 1920).
ROAD

It is settled that the owner is under no duty to a bare licensee
to keep the premises in safe condition. Plummer v. Dul, 156
Mass. 426, 31 N. E. 128. There is no commonly accepted rule
in this country as to the duty of a railroad company to keep a

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol27/iss3/12

2

